This paper investigates energy ef ciency for the two-tier femtocell networks through combining game theory and stochastic learning. With the Stackelberg game formulation, a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework is developed to study the joint expected utility maximization of macrocells and femtocells. The macrocells behave as the leaders and the femtocells are followers during the learning procedure. At each time step, the leaders commit to dynamic strategies based on the best responses of the followers, while the followers compete against each other with no further information but the leaders' strategy information. In this paper, two learning algorithms are proposed to schedule each cell's transmission power. Numerical results are presented to validate the proposed studies and show that the two learning algorithms substantially improve the energy ef ciency of the femtocell networks. Recently, femtocells have been considered as a promising technique to improve the indoor experience of the mobile users [2]. This paper addresses the energy ef ciency in femtocell networks. The problem of energy-ef cient spectrum sharing and power allocation in cognitive radio femtocells was studied in [3] , where a three-stage Stackelberg game was formulated to improve the energy ef ciency. On the other hand, the cross-tier/co-tier interference greatly restricts the overall network performance. However, the unplanned deployment of femtocells results in unpredictable interference patterns. The interference generally can not be handled by means of centralized network scheduling, because the number and locations of femtocells are unknown. For such networking scenarios, the femtocells are most likely to be autonomous,
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapidly rising energy consumption and greater awareness of environmental protection have created an urgent need for energy-ef cient greener wireless communication techniques. In wireless cellular networks, the radio access part is the main source of energy consumption, accounting for up to more than of the total energy consumption [1] . Therefore, it's crucial to increase the energy ef ciency in wireless access networks to meet the challenges raised by the exponential growth in mobile services and energy consumption.
which motivates applying the idea of reinforcement learning (RL) [4] . A realtime multi-agent RL algorithm was proposed in [5] to optimize the network performance by alleviating the cross-tire interference in femtocell networks. In [6] , a distributed learning scheme based on -learning was developed to manage the femto-to-macrocell interference.
In this paper, we model the energy ef ciency aspect of interference mitigation in femtocell networks as a Stackelberg learning game, i.e., leader-follower learning process, with the following three characteristics: 1) the macrocells are considered to be the leaders, whereas the femtocells are considered to be the followers; 2) the leaders behave by knowing the responses of the femtocells to their strategy decisions; 3) given the leaders' decisions, the followers compete with each other. Learning is accomplished by directly interacting with the surrounding environment and properly adjusting the strategies according to the realizations of achieved performance. The solution of such a learning game is the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). If no hierarchy exists during the learning procedure, the Stackelberg learning game reduces to the non-cooperative learning game, which was discussed in [7] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the energy ef ciency problem in femtocell networks. Section III de nes a Stackelberg game theoretic solution for the users' hierarchical behaviors. In Section IV, a Stackelberg learning framework is proposed, and two reinforcement learning based algorithms are further derived. The numerical results are provided in Section V to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The femtocell network is shown in Fig. 1 . Each macrocell consisting of a macrocell base station (BS) and multiple macrocell users (MUs), is underlaid with several co-channel femtocells. In each femtocell, there is one femtocell BS providing service to the femtocell users (FUs). We focus on the closed access policy, since the customers may prefer that kind of policy because of privacy concerns and limited backhaul bandwidth. Assume same distribution of femtocells in each macrocell, we analyze the case of one representative macrocell 978-1-4673-3122-7/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE IEEE ICC 2013 -Communication QoS, Reliability and Modeling Symposium , coexisting with femtocells . Users of the same macrocell /femtocell adopt time division multiple access (TDMA) for data transmission, thus causing no interference to each other. In the following, the uplink transmission in the femtocell network is investigated.
For analytical tractability, co-channel interference from neighboring macrocell is ignored. Let denote the index of scheduled user in . Designate the power level of user as , the received signalto-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of user at BS is
Here denote all the other users in the set except user , is the background noise, and is the set of channel gains from user to BS in . Each user aims to improve the energy ef ciency, i.e., (2) where is the spectrum bandwidth, and denotes the additional circuit power consumption of user during the transmissions and is independent from .
Given the minimum SINR requirement , user 's utility function can be formally de ned as if otherwise.
(
Whenever becomes infeasible, the MU transmits with , meanwhile the macrocell can request the FUs to reduce their . In all situations, each user tries to nd the optimal power level that maximizes its utility, i.e.,
III. STACKELBERG GAME THEORETIC SOLUTION Within the Stakelberg game framework, the MU is modeled as the leader, while the FUs as the followers competing with each other over the identical spectrum. SE describes an optimal strategy for the MU if all FUs always react by playing their Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies in the smaller sub-game. In order to investigate the existence of an SE, we rst de ne to be the best response to if (5) User 's best response to is denoted as BR . Let NE be the NE strategy of the FUs if the MU chooses to play , that is,
The strategy pro le NE is an SE if and only if NE NE (7) The following theorem establishes the existence of the SE. Theorem 1. The SE always exists in our de ned Stackelberg game with the MU leading and the FUs following.
Proof: For , there is at least one NE in the game , since for , 1) the strategy pro le is a non-empty, convex, and compact subset of some Euclidean space ; 2)
is continuous in and quasi-concave in . Therefore, there exists , such that
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. STACKELBERG LEARNING FRAMEWORK During the Stackelberg learning procedure, each user behaves as an intelligent agent, whose objective is to maximize its utility. The game is played repeatedly to achieve the optimal strategies. The Stackelberg learning framework has two levels of hierarchy: 1) the MU aims to optimize its own energy ef ciency by knowing the responses of all FUs for each possible play; 2) given the policy of MU, the FUs play a noncooperative game among each other. This section emphasizes on how to reach the optimal communication con guration of the femtocell network through RL approach.
A policy for user at time step is then de ned to be a probability vector y , where means the probability with which user chooses action (power level) from a nite discrete set with dimension , and is the policy set available to user . Thus the expected utility of user at time slot can be expressed as follows y y E user plays policy y p p (9) where p is the vector of all users' actions, and is the space of all action vectors. For any stationary policy 1 Inspired by [8] , we can prove the Theorem 2 as follows.
Proof: If the MU follows a stationary policy y , then the Stackelberg learning game is simpli ed to be a -player stochastic learning game. It has been shown in [9] that every nite strategic-form game has a mixed policy equilibrium, that is, there always exists a NE y in our formulation of the discrete power allocation game given the MU's policy y . The rest of the proof follows directly from the de nition of an SE, and is thus omitted for brevity.
A. Reinforcement Learning based Algorithm-I (RLA-I)
During the Stackelberg learning, the MU behaves as the leader and knows the policy information of all FUs. Users with RL ability learn to maximize their individual expected utilities through repeated interactions with the networking environment. Among different kinds of RL implementations, here we consider the so-called -learning [10] , where each user's policy is parameterized through the -function that characterizes the relative expected utility of a particular power level. Speci cally, let denote the -value of user 's corresponding power level at time . After selecting at time , the -value is updated according to y (12) where is the learning rate, and y p p (13) However, each FU doesn't know other competing FUs' private policies y , and the only information it has is the MU's transmission parameters. Since the FU is able to compute p with the feedback information from BS in , the y can be estimated using
where is given in (15), is the number of times when the MU selects power level and the FU selects power level until time slot , and denotes the power level selected by the MU at time . The updating rule of FU in (12) can then be rewritten as (16)
Next, we need to specify how the user selects power levels. The most common method is to use a Boltzmann distribution, that is, the probability of choosing power level at time is given by [4] (17)
where the temperature controls the exploration frequency. Now we present the detailed description of the reinforcement learning based algorithm-I.
RLA-I

Initialization:
, initialize , for all and . End Initialization Learning:
. Update the policies according to (17), for all . The MU chooses according to and broadcasts the information of to all FUs. Each FU selects according to and sends the information of to the MU. Users measure their with the feedback information from the intended BS. If , then p can be achieved; otherwise, the zero utility is obtained. The MU updates y according to (13) ; and the FUs update basing on (14) and (15). The MU and the FUs update -values according to (12) and (16), respectively.
End Learning
The learning algorithm results in a stochastic process of choosing power level, so we need to investigate the long-term behavior of the learning procedure. Along with the discussion in [11] , we have the following differential equation describing the evolution of the -values:
Basically, we would like to express the dynamics in terms of policies rather than the -values. Toward this end, we differentiate (17) with respect to and use (18). The set of equations expressed by (19) can be arrived. The rst term in braces of (19) asserts that the probability of selecting increases with a rate proportional to the overall ef ciency of that policy, while the second term describes the user's tendency to randomize over all power levels. Let y y be the policy pro le of all users at time . In the following analysis, we resort to an ordinary differential equation (ODE) whose solution approximates the convergence of [12] . We represent the right-hand side of (19) by . With any initial , will converges weakly, as , to y NE y which is the solution of solutions of (20) are by de nition stationary points. This implies that RLA-I will only converge to stationary points. This means that stationary points that are not SEs are stable, which contradicting Theorem 2.
B. Reinforcement Learning based Algorithm-II (RLA-II)
In this subsection, to promote potential cooperation among the non-cooperative FUs, we further design a conjecture model that links each FU's current policy to other FUs' policies [13] . Each FU thinks any change in its transmission policy will induce other FUs to make well-de ned changes in the corresponding time slot. More explicitly, we need to express FU 's contention measure p in (13) through a belief
where is the belief factor. In other words, each FU believes that a change of in its policy at time will induce a change of in the contention measure related to the policies of other FUs. It's worth mentioning here that although FU may be aware that other FUs are subject to many in uences on their policies, it does not take into account whether or not FU might react to FU 's policy variations. The belief model in (21) is based on the concept of reciprocity, which refers to the interaction mechanisms in which the FUs repeatedly interact when choosing the power level. If they realize that their probabilities of interacting with each other in the future is high, they will consider their in uence on the policies of other FUs. Otherwise, they will act myopically, which is the same learning process as in Section IV-A. Following the previous analysis, (14) thus becomes p p p
Therefore, the RLA-II is proposed to discover the SE policy by replacing in (16) with (22). RLA-II is similar to RLA-I except that the FUs update their -values based on (14) in RLA-I.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides insight into the performance comparison of the both proposed learning algorithms through simulations. We consider a representative macrocell scenario where there are two FUs coexisting with one MU over a common spectrum with MHz. The minimum SINR requirements of MU and FUs are dB and dB, respectively. For simplicity, we suppose that the additional circuit power consumption is dBm for all users, and the belief factors in RLA-II are all equal to . The femtocells are uniformly distributed within a circle area centered at the macrocell BS with radius of m, while the coverage radius of femtocell is m. The channel gains are generated by a lognormal shadowing pathloss model, , where is the distance between user and BS in , and is the pathloss exponent and is assumed to be in simulations. We set the action set of power levels for all users to be dBm, and the power of noise to be dBm. Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the learning process of expected utilities for each user. The results are compared with:
1) The fully cooperative game with complete information exchange (Case I) -each user knows other users' the utility functions and power levels in the network, thus the optimal utilities can be calculated according to (4) . 2) The non-cooperative learning process without any information exchange (Case II) -each user's transmission policy is self-incentive with myopic best response correspondence, which was discussed in [7] . The rst observation from our simulation results is that, whenever we generate the initial random probability distributions over the power levels, the equilibrium state of the transmission policies achieved by all users is independent of these initial values. That is, there exists an SE in the Stackelberg learning game, which con rms Theorem 2. Secondly, we can nd from the curves that the expected utilities of all users deploying the proposed algorithms during the learning process will nally converge (or approach) to the equilibrium point in Case I, and these simulation results validate the conclusion of Theorem 3. In addition, the reinforcement learning based algorithms both outperform Case II, which is because for a Stackelberg learning game, knowing more can improve not only the leader's (MU) own utility, but also the utilities of the followers (FUs). Meanwhile, the RLA-II can achieve better performance than RLA-I. This is due to the fact that all FUs have the incentive to achieve better utilities thus behave reciprocally by exchanging policy information in the previous time slot (indicated by (21)). Fig. 5 shows the achieved expected SINRs of the two FUs using RLA-I and RLA-II, respectively, versus the MU's minimum SINR requirement . It can be observed that for the same , the expected SINRs of the FUs with RLA-II is in general higher than that with RLA-I. This is in accordance with our previous discussions. It is also worth mentioning that when is suf ciently large, the expected SINRs of the FUs approach to zero for both of the two proposed learning algorithms. This is because when is suf ciently large, there is no femtocell active in the networks.
VI. CONCLUSION In this paper, energy ef ciency is investigated for the uplink transmissions in a spectrum sharing based two-tier femtocell network, using the theory of stochastic learning. A Stackelberg learning framework is proposed to study the joint expected utility maximization of the MU and the FUs. Based on reinforcement learning, we derive two algorithms, namely, RLA-I and RLA-II, whose convergence stabilities have further been theoretically proven. Numerical experiments illustrate that the reciprocity-inspired RLA-II converges more quickly and achieves better performance compared to the RLA-I and the non-cooperative learning scheme. This comes at the expense of exchanging historical policy information at FUs. Concludingly, both the learning algorithms show the potential in improving the energy ef ciency in greener femtocell networks.
